| 索引號 | Chung, Ching-Yi, Bank and economic development in China and the United States during the 1920s and 1930s
(2004) |
| 類型 | Dissertation |
| 作者 | Chung, Ching-Yi |
| 題名 | Bank and economic development in China and the United States during the 1920s and 1930s
|
| 年份 | 2004 |
| 大學 | UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE |
| 碩/博士論文 | M.A. |
| 語言 | English |
| 主題 | Unknown |
| 關鍵字 | bank, finance, money, economy |
| 摘要 | This dissertation consists of three chapters on bank and
economic development. The first two chapters focus on
China and the last on the United States. The first
chapter examines the relationship between the levels of
managerial ownership and bank performance using archival
data on banks in Shanghai between 1912 and 1937. Using
panel data econometric techniques, the analysis finds
that manager's equity stake in the bank explains little
of bank's performance. Possible explanations for the
apparent insignificance of managerial ownership include
the level of managerial labor supply, managers' desire to
raise their financial and/or social status and the
guarantor system, which directly or indirectly promoted
high levels of performance.
The second chapter compares the lending and investment
patterns of Chinese and foreign banks and examines how
these differences influence economic growth in China in
the 1930s. Estimation results show that foreign banks
invested eight percent more in stocks and bonds than
Chinese banks. This difference harmed the Chinese economy
for a brief period between 1932 and 1935. When examining
the history of Chinese banking and financial market
development, we can see that foreign banks diverted
capital away from China to invest in securities and debt
issued in their home countries. China lacked such markets
and thus could not retain funds within its boundaries.
The third chapter examines banks and the deposit
insurance policy in the United States for the same period
as the previous two chapters. Eight states established
deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917. All
abandoned the schemes between 1921 and 1930. New data
drawn from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors demonstrate that deposit insurance influenced
the composition of bank suspensions in those states. In
typical years, suspensions due to runs fell. Suspensions
due to mismanagement rose. During the penultimate year of
each system, the suspension rate rose to an unsustainable
height and the system suspended operations. The
experiences of these eight states provide lessons for
deposit insurance systems in developing nations today.
|
| 文件類型 | Print |
